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ARTICLES

WHAT CONGRESS KNOWS AND SOMETIMES DOESN'T
KNOW
Muriel Morisey Spence*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a striking feature of the legislative process that Congress is neither required to articulate reasons for its actions nor
subject to constitutional challenge merely on the ground that its
choices are uninformed.' The Constitution contains a variety of
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University. -B., 1969, Radcliffe College,
Harvard University, J.D., 1977, Georgetown University Law Center. This work benefitted substantially from the comments and suggestions of Scott Burris, Rick
Greenstein, Wendy Kaminer, Ron Levin, Michael Libonati, Mark Rahdert, Henry
Richardson and Bob Reinstein. Lisa Barton and Dan Cummings provided invaluable
research assistance.
1. These points are implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819), holding that the Constitution permits Congress to determine the means of carrying out its enumerated powers. Though
in McCulloch the Court was addressing the substance of what Congress considered
"necessary and proper" legislation, it is fully consistent with McCulloch to conclude
that Congress has even more latitude with respect to procedural choices. Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) provides additional implicit support for the proposition
that Congress is bound only by the Constitution's express procedural requirements.
More recent support appears in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), United States
v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) and FCC v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct.
2096 (1993).
Articulated reasons for legislation are common, either in statutory findings,
statements of policy or purpose, or in legislative history, but such reasons are not
constitutionally necessary. Congress must maintain a record of its proceedings, but
the Constitution states only that "[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Useful general references on
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procedural rules for enacting legislation.2 It also requires that
statutes conform to a number of substantive requirements.3
But Congress has traditionally enjoyed wide latitude in deciding
whether and to what extent it bases decisions on policy-relevant
knowledge4 or articulates the factual foundations for its ac-

congressional practices include WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES (8th ed. 1993); CHARLES TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE (1989).
This article focuses exclusively on the federal legislature. State constitutions are
far more likely to have detailed provisions with respect to legislative procedure. Professor Popkin observes that
[tihis reflects deep suspicion of the state legislative process. State legislatures have traditionally consisted of poorly paid part time legislators
who lack resources of their own to research the issues and draft statutes ....
Most of the procedural rules were embedded in the State constitutions during the 19th Century, when private economic interests often
dominated state legislatures and obtained legislation for private gain.
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 195 (1993). For summaries and analysis of state constitutional provisions on legislative procedure, see, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (8th ed. 1927); OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 431-562 (2d ed. 1993); 1 & 2 C. DALLAS
SANDS & MICHAEL E. LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 3.01-4.23, 11.01-11.33
(1982); STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Robert F. Williams, ed.
1993).
2. Most notable are the bicameralism and presentment requirements, including
the veto and override provisions, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses. The requirement that federal legislation contain an enacting clause is
statutory. 1 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Most of Congress' other procedures are also statutory, not constitutional, in origin. There is a thorough discussion of "the federal and
state constitutional provisions that structure and condition the framework within
which the legislature performs its constitutional fumctions" in HETZEL ET AL., supra
note 1. See also Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197
(1976).
3. These include, for example, the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
4. There are many philosophical questions one could ask about the meaning of
"knowledge." This article incorporates a practical understanding of the term. For the
purposes of this article, "policy-relevant knowledge" includes the wide range of empirical data and research that can inform the policy choices Congress makes. Examples
include the research that has established the link between cigarette smoking and
certain health conditions. The link is not beyond scientific debate, but public and private policy-makers are on solid ground proceeding on the basis that the link actually
exists. Another example is the research correlating seat belt use with mortality rates
in automobile accidents. Social scientists may debate the reliability of this data, but
legislatures and private citizens can make rational decisions on the basis that seat
belt use promotes safety. Similarly, there are analyses supporting the proposition that
changing from a graduated to a flat federal income tax rate would result in changed
tax burdens for most taxpayers. It might be impossible for anyone to predict accu-
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tions.5 Until recently, even when evaluating statutes under
close judicial scrutiny,6 the Supreme Court has tended to defer
to Congress' special competence as the fact-finding branch of
the federal government Such deference recognizes the significant fact-finding value inherent in Congress' ability to conduct
hearings and investigations, to subpoena witnesses and documents, and to assign to legislative committees and staff responsibility for detailed scrutiny of legislative proposals, their factual foundations and their suitability as responses to social policy
concerns. It also recognizes that the variety of backgrounds and
interests among legislators enables them to draw upon a wide
knowledge of social and economic conditions. In addition, the
tradition of judicial deference respects the democratically elected legislature as the primary source of statutory law.8
This article examines some contemporary aspects of the tradi-

rately, before implementation, the extent of such changes and which income groups
would be most affected, but Congress has substantial cause to believe that one way
to redistribute the tax burden is to switch from a graduated to a flat rate. Sometimes policy-relevant knowledge bears on whether and to what extent a particular
problem exists. For example, as Congress debates whether to adopt a constitutional
amendment to protect the United States flag, the policy-relevant knowledge includes
information on the nature and frequency of incidents of flag desecration.
This understanding of "knowledge" refers to something more substantial than
anecdotal evidence, although such evidence has an important and appropriate place in
public debate and the building of political support for legislation actions. It may be
an insufficient basis on which to make some decisions, however, and is subject to
over-use. The examples discussed in part I, infra are instances where, in addition to
taking too little account of available empirical knowledge, Congress may have relied
too heavily on anecdotes as support for their policy conclusions.
Among those who have reflected on the use of knowledge and its relationship
to democratic decisionmaking are ISAIAH BERLIN, FROM HOPE AND FEAR SET FREE, reprinted in CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, at 173 (Henry Hardy,
ed. 1979); AARON WILDAvsKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF
POLICY ANALYSIS (1979).

5. As the authors of a leading casebook on legislation observe, "lilt is settled
law that the trappings of procedural due process, e.g. notice and an opportunity to be
heard, are in- applicable to 'legislative' decisions." HETZEL ET AL., supra note 1, at
729.
6. A significant example is the Supreme Court's decision about the constitutionality of a race-based statute in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995), discussed infra part HA.
7. See infra part HA
8. For a valuable review of judicial and scholarly views on statutes as sources of
law, see WJLAM N. ESKIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 385-423 (2d ed. 1994).

656

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:653

tion of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding and offers
three observations.9
First, the Supreme Court's decisions in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena"° and United States v. Lopez" constitute an
invitation to courts to review statutes with little or no deference to the legislature's fact-finding role.' In Adarand, the
Court concluded that the proper standard of review for all statutory racial classifications should be strict scrutiny, overruling
a decision" that had called for a lesser standard of review for
federal statutes with benign purposes.'4 In Lopez, the Court
struck down a federal statute prohibiting firearms in areas near
public schools. 5 The Court held that the statute exceeded
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause." The
Adarand and Lopez decisions should be viewed in combination
with the textualist approach to statutory interpretation as part
of a disturbing judicial challenge to Congress' position as the
authoritative source of statutory law. 7 They are also signs of
a larger trend toward limiting the federal government and challenging the legitimacy of many of its actions. This trend appears grounded to a great extent in revitalized judicial interest
in the Tenth Amendment." For example, in New York v. Unit-

9. For a useful volume providing historical and comparative perspectives, see
KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND THE CONGRESS (William H. Robinson & Clay H. Wellborn
eds., 1991) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE CONGRESS]. Some of the themes
in this article appear in Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: "The Illusion of
Certainty," 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1723 (1995). Professor Rogovin's inquiry focuses on "the
sources of and justifications for a judicial requirement that legislation be supported
by empirical data." Id. at 1727.
10. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
11. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
12. See infra parts II.A & II.B. The assertion about Adarand is not a criticism of
the Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny, but rather a comment on what the Court
says strict scrutiny entails.
13. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
14. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. The decision also undercut the holding in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), which upheld a federal statute establishing racial set-asides for certain public works contracts.
15. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
16. Id. at 1626-34.
17. See infra part II.C.
18. The Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. x.
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ed States,19 the Supreme Court held that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act's provisions requiring states to either
accept ownership of waste or regulate it according to congressional instructions went beyond Congress' enumerated powers and
was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment." In 1995 four
Justices made their convictions about the scope and force of the
Tenth Amendment explicit through Justice Thomas' dissent, in
a case striking down congressional term limits:
As far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, then, the
States can exercise all powers that the Constitution does
not withhold from them. The Federal government and the
States thus face different default rules: where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that
is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly
or by necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks
that power and the States enjoy it. These basic principles
are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment... 21
Even Congress seeks to reduce the role of the federal government. A centerpiece of the welfare reform legislation, for example, is increasing use of "block grants" that give money for
social programs to the states with far fewer federal constraints
on how they may use the funds.'
Second, while the Supreme Court accords too little deference
to congressional fact-finding in some situations, the electorate
19. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
20. Id. at 177.
21. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1876 (1995). (Thomas, J.,

dissenting) (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and the Chief Justice). As discussed
infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text, this perspective is quite similar to the

views the Court expressed in several pre-1937 cases.
22. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. The bill was presented to the President on December 29, 1995 and
vetoed on January 9, 1996. Congress also has limited its own role in the spending
process. The 104th Congress enacted legislation giving the President the authority to
veto specific items in appropriations bills. S.4, Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 1995,
Pub. L. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996). One of the vigorous opponents of the legislation, Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), said:
It is difficult to imagine why this body would want to deal such a painful blow, not only to itself, but to this basic structure of our constitutional form of government and to the interests of the people we represent ....
[The legislation] simply gives away too much of the congressional control over the purse strings to the president.
142 CoNG. REc. S2929-02, S2940 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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should press Congress to make better use of factual information.3 The assertion that the Court should return to a deferential stance towards congressional fact-finding may seem at first
to be inconsistent with the proposition that the electorate
should be tougher on Congress. But these ideas can co-exist
because of the distinction between the Court's limited role in
our constitutional structure and the electorate's right to question whether Congress is legislating wisely. In deciding whether
certain congressional actions are consistent with the Constitution, the Supreme Court has a duty to respect Congress' status
as a co-equal branch of government. The first observation comments critically on the Supreme Court's exercise of that duty.
On the other hand, when evaluating Congress, the electorate it
is not limited to the question whether legislation is constitutionally valid. The electorate is free to ask whether Congress is
making wise and well-informed choices. Moreover, at a time
when the Supreme Court is less deferential to Congress with
respect to its fact-finding role, tougher scrutiny by the electorate may spur Congress to carry out that role with greater care.
This second observation is, in part, a critical comment on the
electorate's exercise of its influence on Congress.
The link between these two observations receives implicit
support from Judge Pollak in his foreword to a recent symposium on Lopez.' Speculating whether Lopez will lead to the
striking down of other statutes by the Court, he noted:
[T]o the extent that happens, it seems fair to surmise that
a number of such casualties will be attributable not to a
restless activism on the part of the Justices but to irresponsibility on the part of a Congress that has failed to make
out even a minimally plausible case for utilizing the commerce power to undergird a new regulatory scheme, especially one that deals with problems historically regarded as
chiefly of state and local concern.'
As the judge's comment points out, both the Court's perspective
on congressional power and the strength of Congress' articulat-

23. See discussion infra part III.
24. Judge Louis H. Pollak, Foreword to Symposium: Reflections on United States
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995).
25. Id. at 551-52.
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ed justifications for its actions influence the determination of
whether statutes survive judicial scrutiny.
Finally, to counter the troubling effects of Adarand and
Lopez, to enrich public policy debate and decision-making, and
to strengthen the factual records that are subject to judicial
review, Congress should take increasing care to develop and
articulate the factual foundations of its actions."
These observations are part of an ongoing debate among legal
and political science scholars about the tension between political and empirical bases for legislative decisionmakingY The
policy science literature of the mid-twentieth century also reflects scholarly interest in whether legislative deliberation can
be improved through the incorporation of concepts and practices
associated primarily with the "hard" sciences." Another body
of literature on how decisionmakers use social science research
examines the practices of contemporary policy-makers in all
branches of government and in the private sector.2 9 Recently,
members of the scientific community have made vocal complaints that policy-makers ignore scientific knowledge."
The debate about what sorts of decisions are best made by
judges and which should be left to legislators is also pertinent
to the themes in this article.3 ' Three complementary views on
this question inform the assertions made here. The first view is
that judges are essential guardians of the enduring principles

26. See infra part IV.
27. For a discussion of these themes, see generally ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 8, at 383-511.
28. See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES (1971).
29. See, e.g., DANIEL A. DREYFUS, THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICY RESEARCH IN CONGRESSIONAL DECISION MAKING in USING SOCIAL RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING
100 (Carol Weiss, ed. 1977); KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND THE CONGRESS, supra note 9;
Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279 (1995);
Charles E. Lindblom & David K. Cohen, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling
Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79-88 (1959) (discussing the use of knowledge in the
private sector).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
31. For informative discussions of that debate, see Henry W. Bikle, JudicialDetermination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971); ESHRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 8.
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articulated in the Constitution but are ill-equipped to make
most of the factual and policy determinations that are the province of the legislature. 2 The second view is that the deliberations of a democratically elected legislature yield more legitimate answers to complex policy judgments than the reflections
of appointed judges, even though the legislature may sometimes
choose to make only limited use of available fact-based knowledge. The third view is that because legislators make so many
significant factual and policy determinations, they have an
obligation to be thorough and thoughtful in their deliberations;
this necessarily includes a duty to consider as much policyrelevant knowledge as they can realistically absorb.
Part II of this article discusses the judicial challenge to Congress. Part III argues for a higher level of voter scrutiny of how
Congress uses fact-based knowledge. Using contemporary examples, it comments critically on how Congress uses available
knowledge. Finally, it discusses why court challenges and the
electoral process are insufficient ways to monitor whether Congress uses information effectively. Part IV offers recommendations on what Congress and the public might do differently.
II.

IMPLICATIONS OF NON-DEFERENTIAL JUDGING BY THE
COURT

The ways in which Congress uses or fails to use policy-relevant knowledge have implications for the legitimacy of statutory

law, partly because of the movement away from judicial deference to Congress' factual deliberations and conclusions. This
change in judicial deference is revealed in the June 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.3 The Court framed
its analysis in Adarand as an inquiry into the appropriate
constitutional standard for evaluating race-specific federal statutes and concluded that:

32. There are limits to legislative competence, of course. Legislatures are not
competent to determine the appropriate medical treatment for illnesses, for example.
The matters on which judges have traditionally deferred to legislatures involve subjects within the realm of legislative competence. The issues Justice O'Connor says the
City of Richmond should have considered before enacting a race-specific ordinance
(quoted infra note 76 and accompanying text) are good examples.
33. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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[A]R racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests.'
A careful reading of the case and those leading up to it supports the conclusion that five Justices35 are willing to have the
Court's analysis of what constitutes a compelling governmental
interest and a narrowly tailored response to that interest virtually ignore the factual conclusions drawn by Congress. The
decision thus undermines the legitimacy of statutory law because Congress' factual conclusions, an area that has traditionally been its domain, receive little deference from the Court.
This is not an inevitable result of strict scrutiny analysis but
flows instead from this Court's evident willingness to discount
the value of Congress' factual support for its statutes.
A. HistoricalBackground
Before discussing Adarand and the cases leading up to it
more fully, some historical context may be useful. While there
have been instances in which the Court refused to defer to
congressional findings of fact in striking down statutes (notably
the striking down of elements of the welfare state)," there has
been a tradition of judicial deference to legislative findings, and
the presumption that facts exist that will support the constitutionality of legislation."7
This tradition is grounded in the earliest judicial statements
on the contours of judicial and legislative authority. In
McCulloch v. Maryland,8 Chief Justice Marshall articulated

34. Id. at 2117.
35. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 2101.
36. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
37. Cox, supra note 31, reviews this pattern of judicial behavior.
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (raising the specific questions whether Congress
had the authority to incorporate a bank and whether the State of Maryland had the
authority to tax it).
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Congress' authority to enact legislation that would create legal
obligations binding on the states:
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must
allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be
carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.39
Marshall went on to make clear that while the Supreme
Court had a duty to strike down statutes that were either "prohibited by the constitution"" or "for the accomplishment of
objects not [e]ntrusted to the government,"4 ' there is a limit to
the judicial authority to substitute its judgment for that of Congress:
[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated
to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity,
would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and to tread on legislative ground.42
A number of the judicial statements urging that the Court
should defer to Congress' judgment about what laws were necessary and appropriate came in the context of statutes enacted
under the Commerce Clause. The Court's decisions reflected the
perspective that a legislature is typically more competent at
fact-finding than an appellate court. A related theme was that
judicial review is inherently counter-majoritarian. When it is
employed to second guess the legislature on essentially factual
determinations it also undermines the legislature's ability to
respond to the democratic forces that are supposed to shape
public policy.' For example, in United States v. Carolene Prod39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Cox, supra note 31, at 209-10.

1996]

CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

663

ucts Co.," the Court upheld the Filled Milk Act of 1923, which
prohibited the shipment of "filled milk" in interstate commerce.
The Court stated:
[Wlhere the legislative judgment is drawn into question,
[the inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any
state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it. Here [Carolene Products Co.]
challenges the validity of the statute on its face and it is
evident from all the considerations presented to Congress,
and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the
question is at least debatable whether commerce in filled
milk should be left unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or wholly prohibited. As that decision was for Congress, neither the finding of a court arrived at by weighing
the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be substituted
for it'
Similarly, in United States v. Darby,' the Court upheld provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act setting maximum hours
and minimum wages for covered employees. In Wickard v.
47 the Court upheld a quota for wheat production esFilburn,
tablished by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act. The Court's opinion stated, in part:
The conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and
those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system
to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and
responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend
themselves to judicial determination. And with the wisdom,
workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation we have
nothing to do.'
These decisions were part of a modern disavowal of the earlier view that the Court should actively discourage enactment of
statutes regulating businesses. In Lochner v. New York,49 the
Court struck down a New York statute limiting to sixty hours

44. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

45. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
46. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
47. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

48. Id. at 129.
49. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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per week or ten hours per day the time bakery employees could
be required to work. The Court observed that "[statutes of the
nature of that under review ... are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved
from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the
exercise of the police power .... 0
A similar judicial attitude appeared in Commerce Clause
5 1 for example, the Court
cases. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,
struck down the Child Labor Act that prohibited goods produced with child labor from interstate commerce.
As the Court began to review more cases involving civil liberties and civil rights, it intervened more willingly in the interest
of protecting basic rights, such as those embodied in the First,
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. However,
this primarily took the form of heightened levels of scrutiny
that still preserved the concept of judicial deference. For example, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,52 the Court upheld the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 provision outlawing state literacy
tests for voter registration," taking a broad view of Congress'
authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. It is noteworthy
that Congress acted on the basis of its belief that literacy tests
might be used in discriminatory ways, even though there was
In
no proof of actual Fifteenth Amendment violations.'
Katzenbach v. Morgan,55 the Court upheld that section of the
Voting Rights Act that prohibited States from denying the right
to vote because of a lack of proficiency in English,56 even
though it meant invalidating a state statute. The federal and
state legislatures appeared not to agree on the pertinent findings and conclusions, but the Court deferred to Congress.5 7

50. Id. at 61.
51. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
52. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973a-p (1965), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b,c,aa to bb4 (1994).
54. Cox, supra note 31. at 227.
55. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(e)(2) (1994).
57. Cox, supra note 31, at 212-29. See infra part II.B for a discussion of how the
Lopez decision cuts back on this deference in the context of rational basis review.
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The cases addressing Supreme Court deference to congressional statutes in the area of individual rights and liberties had
almost exclusively involved congressional actions that superseded state statutes. In 1980, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a congressional race-specific set-aside for federal public
works contracts.58 While the majority generated three separate
opinions, all those voting to uphold the statute agreed that
Congress was empowered to enact remedial legislation aimed at
racial discrimination and could conclude that there was an
ample historical basis on which to determine that the action
was necessary.59 It is noteworthy that a majority of the Court
was willing to uphold the racial set-aside even though it was
introduced during House floor debate of the public works legislation without prior hearings and without any congressional
factual findings that were specific to this legislation. Chief
Justice Burger stated that "although the Act recites no
preambulatory 'findings' on the subject, we are satisfied that
Congress had abundant historical basis" for its conclusion that
the set-aside was an appropriate means of ensuring equal opportunity for minority businesses to participate in the federal
programs funded by the Act.6 ° In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell also noted that Congress is not to be treated like a
lower court, bound to make specific findings of fact to accompany each statute.6 '
In City of Richmond v. Croson Co. 2 the Supreme Court held
that a Richmond, Virginia ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The ordinance required
non-minority-owned prime contractors on city construction projects to grant at least thirty percent of the subcontracts to minority-owned firms.63

58. Public Works Employment Act § 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1977).
59. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-78 (1980).

60. Id. at 478.
61. Id. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring) Justice Stevens dissented in Fullilove,
largely on the basis that Congress had failed to engage in sufficient deliberation prior
to enactment, but even he concluded that prior to enactment of the program at issue
in Adarand, Congress had deliberated enough. Id. at 549-54. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). There was no majority opinion. The plurality opinion by
Justice O'Connor is the most often cited and quoted.
63. RICHmiOND, VA., CODE § 12-156(a) (1985).
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The plurality in Croson made several points directly relating
to the question of Congress' special authority to make factual
determinations. The opinion noted that:
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a
specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The power to "enforce" may at
times also include the power to define situations which
Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to
adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations."
Quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan,6 5 the plurality observed, that
"'[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
The plurality emphasized that Congress has distinct authority
to determine how to enforce key constitutional provisions. The
plurality said of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
that, "'[tihey were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of the power
of Congress.'"" It also quoted from a lower federal court opinion and two law review articles highlighting the differences
between Congress and nonfederal entities in that regard."
The plurality also said that "[t]he fact-finding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary .
but cautioned

64. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (emphasis in original).
65. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
66. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
67. Id. (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1800)).
68. Id. at 491. "The city is not just like the federal government with regard to
the findings it must make to justify race-conscious remedial action." Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d, 922, 929 (1987);
"Fullilove clearly focused on the constitutionality of a congressionally mandated setaside program." Drew S. Days III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 474 (1987). "Congress
may authorize, pursuant to section 5, state action that would be foreclosed to the
states acting alone." Robert A. Bohrer, Bakke, Weber and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND. L.J.
473, 512-13 (1981). As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Adarand, the
Adarand majority disavowed these statements in Croson as reason to review federal
statues under a less strict standard of review. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2124-25
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
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against "blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity.... "7 0 The plurality concluded that
the legislative fact-finding preceding enactment of the Richmond
ordinance was inadequate to support the adoption of the racespecific statute under review.' At no point, however, did the
Court address the question of what would constitute adequate
fact-finding by Congress. The issue of congressional authority to
enact provisions similar to the one in Croson had already been
addressed in Fullilove and was not before the Court in Croson.
The Croson plurality opinion also supports the proposition
that factual findings by the legislature play an important role
in the specific tasks of determining whether a statute addresses
a compelling governmental interest and sets out a narrowly
tailored remedy. Relying in part on Justice Powell's opinion in
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 2 the plurality observed that the governmental interest in remedying past discrimination must be grounded in "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.....'"" An earlier reference to Wygant v. Jackson Board
7 4 also reinforces the proposition that
of Education
findings are
an important element in these determinations.7 5 Justice
O'Connor stated specifically what kinds of facts the City of
Richmond should have evaluated:
In the case at hand, the city has not ascertained how many
minority enterprises are present in the local construction
market nor the level of their participation in city construction projects. The city points to no evidence that qualified
minority contractors have been passed over for city contracts or subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual case. Under such circumstances, it is simply impossible
to say that the city has demonstrated a "strong basis in
evidence
for its conclusion that remedial action was neces76
sary."

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 501.
Id. at 505-10.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Croson, 488 U.S. at 485.
Id. at 510 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
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The plurality concluded that the city "failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in apportioning the public contracting opportunities on the basis of race."7 7
The plurality's recognition of the saliency of legislative findings is an important part of the context for discussing Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission78
and Adarand.
In Metro Broadcasting,the Court upheld the constitutionality
of two Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policies that
gave minority owned enterprises preferences in seeking to obtain or retain radio and television broadcast licenses.79 The
policies were not designed to remedy identified discrimination
but instead reflected federal efforts to promote minority participation in the broadcasting industry."0 The Court held that because the FCC policies bore the "imprimatur of longstanding
congressional support," were done in response to a congressional
statutory command, and were "substantially related to the
achievement of the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity," they did not violate equal protection principles.8
On the issue of the justification for the race-specific policies,
the majority opinion discussed the congressional and Commission consideration of the policies at length, 2 including specific
reference to the Commission's consideration of alternatives to
the adopted policies.83 The dissenters, in an opinion authored
by Justice O'Connor," discounted the legislative and agency
deliberations, objecting that they failed to establish a factual
predicate for the proposition that there is a nexus between a
station owner's race and the station's programming." The dissenters made their disdain for congressional findings quite plain:

77. Id. at 505.
78. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 552-53.
81. Id. at 563, 567, 569.
82. Id. at 572-92.
83. Id. at 584.
84. The dissent was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
85. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 627-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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[N]o degree of congressional endorsement may transform
the equation of race with behavior and thoughts into a
permissible basis of governmental action. Even the most
express and lavishly documented congressional declaration
that members of certain races will as owners produce distinct and superior programming would not allow the Government to employ such reasoning to allocate benefits and
burdens among citizens on that basis."s
This statement demeans the congressional goal of increased
diversity in station ownership by suggesting Congress was making a comment about programming quality.
B. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
With Adarand, the perspective on congressional fact-finding
expressed in O'Connor's Metro Broadcastingdissent became the
majority view. Adarand expressly overruled Metro Broadcasting
and undercut Fullilove.8 7 Adarand involved a federal program
that gave the prime contractor under a federal highway construction contract a financial incentive to hire subcontractors
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.88 The program also required the contractor to employ the
rebuttable presumption that such individuals include minorities
or others found to be disadvantaged by the Small Business
Administration.8 9 The Supreme Court held that the proper
standard of review for race specific federal statutes was strict
scrutiny." Because the court of appeals had decided the case
using a lesser standard, the Court remanded the case to the
lower court for further consideration.9 '
The Adarand decision turns strict scrutiny analysis into a
circle that always leads back to a court and virtually excludes

86. Id. at 629 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
87. The dissenters' approach in Metro Broadcasting became the majority view in
Adarand, after Justice Thomas joined the Court. The majority in Adarand consists of
the dissenters in Metro Broadcasting plus Justice Thomas.
88. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102 (citing the Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L.
No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2113.
91. Id. at 2118.
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Congress' determinations. The Court says that strict scrutiny
requires a court to determine whether the interest is compelling
and the remedy narrowly tailored92 but urges that this will not
be fatal to all race-specific statutes. 3 Yet the majority opinion
discounts Congress' evidentiary support for its conclusions on
both points. Both prongs of the inquiry require the assessment
of facts about race discrimination, its impact on business opportunities for minorities, and the success or failure of various
strategies to free minority entrepreneurs from those effects. The
prongs are much like the factors Justice O'Connor noted that
the Richmond City Council should have considered before passing its race-specific ordinance.9 4 These factual matters are far
more suited to legislative investigation and deliberation than
judicial inquiry. A legislature is not confined to the factual presentations of specific litigants but can draw upon a wide range
of relevant information gathered through hearings and the review of social science research and government data. Yet the
Adarand decision makes no reference to the congressional deliberations that bear on these issues. For example, the majority
opinion does not mention the legislative hearings Congress
conducted over a period of several years.95 This is in striking
contrast to the decision in Fullilove in which the Court accepted
as a valid factual predicate for the race-specific statute, legislative findings that were not specific to the particular provision
under review. 6 The silence about the congressional predicate
for the statute could be explained by the fact that the Court
had decided to remand the case to the lower courts. But by
discussing the issue of judicial review and how it should be
conducted at such length, with no reference to congressional
fact-finding, the Adarand decision implicitly invites courts to
determine whether the interest is compelling, and whether the

92. Id. at 2113.
93. Id. at 2117.
94. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989); see supra note 76 and
quote in accompanying text.
95. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2130 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the record of
the hearings).
96. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478. Justice Stevens' dissent provides a detailed comparison of the Court's Adarand holding with relevant precedents and questions whether it is "a faithful application of the doctrine of stare decisis." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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remedy is narrowly tailored, with little regard for Congress'
findings and conclusions."7
The Court could have addressed the matter of congressional
fact-finding while still concluding that the matter should be
remanded to the lower courts. For example, the majority might
have encouraged the lower courts to consider whether the congressional hearings or debate addressed the three specific issues
the Court says the court of appeals did not decide: (1) "whether
the interests served by the use of subcontractor compensation
clauses are properly described as 'compelling;'" (2) whether
Congress considered any race-neutral means of achieving its
goals, or (3) whether the program was appropriately limited so
that it would not outlast the discrimination it was designed to
eliminate." The Court could have gone even further and instructed the lower courts to consider Congress' factual findings.
Instead, the majority opinion makes no reference to them.
This is a particular use of the strict scrutiny standard, not
an approach that strict scrutiny makes inevitable.9 9 It is quite
compatible, however, with Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, which dismissed the value of the relevant congressional deliberations. The Metro Broadcasting dissent, for
example, expressly questioned Congress' authority to conclude
that the interest in broadcast diversity was compelling and the
provision narrowly tailored.'00 It also expressly disputed the

97. With respect to the question whether the statute was narrowly tailored, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Tenth Circuit had failed to consider this issue "in terms
of our strict scrutiny cases." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. The Tenth Circuit gave
specific reasons for why it considered the program narrowly tailored, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1546-47 (1994), casting the discussion in terms
of a level of review consistent with Fullilove. Although nothing in Croson suggested
its analysis should be applied to federal statutes, Justice O'Connor's comment suggests that the Tenth Circuit should have used the Croson approach.
98. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (citations omitted).
99. As Justice Stevens points out in his Adarand dissent, the Adarand majority
endorses a vision of strict scrutiny that would support the set-aside provision approved in Fullilove. Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S.
547, 629 (1990); see supra note 86 and quote in accompanying text. In his Adarand
concurrence, Justice Scalia goes even further and asserts that "government can never
have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2101 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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notion that Congress gave careful thought to the FCC policy in
question.''
The dissents written by Justices Stevens and Souter offer
further evidence that Adarand is a judicial retreat from deference to Congress. Justice Stevens urged that even if the Court
in Fullilove had adopted his view that Congress had failed to
justify the racial preference, the statute in Adarand would be
constitutional if principles of stare decisis were appropriately
applied.'1 2 Justice Souter pointed out that the issue of the
standard of review was raised only in the petition for certiorari,
and said he would not have entertained the question of the
standard of review. 10 3 He added:
The statutory scheme must be treated as constitutional if
Fullilove v. Klutznick is applied, and petitioners did not
identify any of the factual premises on which Fullilove
rested as having disappeared since that case was decided.'
The dissenting Justices properly did not claim that the
majority's central motive was to reverse the Court's view of
congressional fact-finding set forth in Fullilove and
strengthened in Metro Broadcasting. The Adarand majority
opinion also reflects the Justices' vision of color-blindness as the
goal of equal protection analysis. The perspective is made most
explicit in Justice Scalia's concurrence where he said, "In the
eyes of the government, we are just one race here."0 5 The majority opinion made much the same point, but did so by quoting
Justice Stevens' dissent in Fullilove. °5 The fact that the colorblindness theme influenced the Court's decision in Adarand is
not inconsistent with the assertion in this article that the
majority's perspective on the value and weight due congressional deliberations also was an influential factor. The dissenting
opinions support the conclusion that Adarand was in part a
deliberate judicial retreat from those decisions deferring to

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 629.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2130 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2113 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)).
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congressional fact-based determinations of what constitute governmental interests and appropriate statutory responses to
identified problems.
Finally, it is ironic that a pivotal step in the Court's movement away from deference to congressional fact-finding comes
during review of legislation that is more likely to have benefitted from extended deliberation. Strict scrutiny is employed in
only a narrow category of situations-usually race-specific statutes, or statutes directly interfering with fundamental
rights.0 7 Such measures typically raise powerful issues of
public values and engender vigorous debate, including questions
about their constitutionality. Thus, Congress is more likely to
have done the kind of thoughtful deliberation argued for in
Part Ill at just those times when the Court is likely to engage
in strict scrutiny.0 8 On the other hand, the Court traditionally has been highly deferential to many congressional enactments with far-reaching social effects because they contain none
of the provisions that trigger strict scrutiny. As discussed in
Part IMl, this is an important reason why the electorate should
evaluate the wisdom of what Congress does in many situations
where judicial scrutiny will be minimal.

107. For example, as noted below, race-specific statutes get strict scrutiny by the
Court while gender-specific statutes do not.
108. It is important to acknowledge that neither the specter of strict scrutiny nor
its use by the Court are sure protections against ill-advised decisionmaking, as the
Court's upholding of measures directed against Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War Il shows. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
It is also important to acknowledge that legislation is sometimes driven by intense
feeling rather than dispassionate deliberation. Statutory restrictions on abortion are
an example. Nevertheless, Congress is more likely to engage in vigorous debate about
matters subject to strict scrutiny.
It is conceivable that greater deference to Congress would make it easier for
Congress to enact legislation intended to discriminate, assuming political support for
such legislation. Justice Stevens responds effectively to this concern by pointing out
that decisions by the majority to discriminate against the minority have regularly
been considered unacceptable. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
We can reasonably expect normative considerations (such as a commitment to protect
minority rights) to moderate the risk that the Court may uphold discriminatory legislation.
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C. United States v. Lopez' °
The Lopez decision shows that Congress can take little comfort in the fact that the majority of its statutes contain no provisions that will trigger heightened scrutiny. Lopez demonstrates that the Court is willing to challenge Congress as the
authoritative source of statutory law even through its use of rational basis review.
In Lopez, the Court affirmed a Fifth Circuit decision"0
striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,"'
which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm"
within a school zone."
In an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist,"' the Court held that the Act exceeds Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause." The majority opinion
reviewed the history of judicial application of the Commerce
Clause and concluded that Congress may regulate intrastate
activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce."
However, the Court held that because the statute regulated
noncommercial activity and its implications for interstate commerce could be identified only by multiple inferences, the statute was an inappropriate imposition of federal authority." 6
The dissenting Justices responded in terms that highlighted
the majority's retreat from deferential review under the rational
basis standard. Justice Souter said:
The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative
judgments "is a paradigm of judicial restraint." In judicial
review under the Commerce Clause, it reflects our respect
for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our
appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's

109. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
110. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1994).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 92 2(q) (1994).
112. Id. § 922(q)(2)(A).
113. He was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. The Lopez
and Adarand majorities are identical.
114. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
115. Id. at 1629.
116. Id. at 1629, 1634.
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political accountability in dealing with matters open to a
wide range of possible choices.11
Because the court of appeals had speculated that explicit
findings about the impact of guns in schools on interstate commerce might have led to a different result, Justice Souter wrote
specifically on the question of legislative findings."
He observed that under a rational basis review, while findings might
provide helpful insight into the legislature's reasoning, they are
not essential." The question for courts "is not whether as a
predicate to legislation Congress in fact found that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.... Nor is
the question whether Congress was correct in so finding. The
only question is whether the legislative judgment is within the
realm of reason."
Justice Souter expressed concern that obliging Congress to
justify its policy choices by making the existence of explicit
congressional findings dispositive "would function merely as an
excuse for covert review of the merits of legislation under standards never expressed and more or less arbitrarily applied.
Under such regime, in any case, the rationality standard of
review would be a thing of the past."
In his dissent, Justice Breyer pursued the point about the
Court's obligation to further defer to Congress' fact-finding
competence.' He wrote, "[u]pholding this legislation would do
no more than simply recognize that Congress had a 'rational
basis' for finding a significant connection between guns in or
near schools and (through their effect on education) the interstate and foreign commerce they threaten."' In an appendix

117. Id. at 1651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 1655-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1655-56. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, amended 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) to include congressional findings on the effects of firearm possession in and around schools on interstate commerce. The majority in Lopez chose not to view them as adequate findings
to support the legislation. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4; see infra notes 234-39 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of Lopez.
120. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1656 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg).
123. Id. at 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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to his opinion he listed twenty-five items of congressional materials supporting such a finding, seventeen items of other federal government materials, and 123 other "readily available"
materials.'
The Court's perspective in Lopez is reminiscent of its attitude
towards legislative powers in the early years of this century.
For example, in Lopez the Court objects to the statute partly on
the ground that it is
a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
"commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms....
[U]nder the Government's ... reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law .

.

. for

example. Under the theories that the Government presents
in support of [the statute] it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal
law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate....
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases
have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action ....

The broad language in

these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further.'
In Lochner v. New York,"B the Court used similar language
to invalidate a New York statute limiting the hours of bakery
workers on the ground that it was not a valid exercise of the
state's police power to advance public health and welfare. The
Court said:

124. Id. at 1665-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1630-31, 1632, 1634 (citations omitted).
126. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a
remote degree, to the public health, does not necessarily
render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must
be appropriate and legitimate....
We think the limit of the police power has been reached
and passed in this case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health or
the health of the individuals who are following the trade of
a baker. If this statute be valid ...

there would seem to be

no M length
to which legislation of this nature might not
7
go-

Lochner involved a state statute while the Court had an even
more limited view of the proper subjects for federal government
action. In 1918, when the Court reviewed the Child Labor Act,
prohibiting factory work by children under fourteen and limiting working hours for older children, it said:
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce,
and not to give it authority to control the states in their
exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture....

The far reaching result of upholding the act cannot be more
plainly indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can
thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority ...

all

freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of
the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus
our system of government be practically destroyed.'
Later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,

9

the Court said:

The general rule with regard to the respective powers of the
national and the state governments under the Constitution,
is not in doubt. The states were before the Constitution;
and consequently, their legislative powers antedated the
Constitution. Those who framed and those who adopted that

127. Id. at 57-58.
128. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273, 276 (1918).
129. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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instrument meant to carve from the general mass of legislative powers, then possessed by the states, only such portions as it was thought wise to confer upon the federal
government; and in order that there should be no uncertainty in respect of what was taken and what was left, the
national powers of legislation were not aggregated but enumerated-with the result that what was not embraced by
the enumeration remained vested in the states without
change or impairment."' 0
Justice Souter expressed concern that Lopez might signal a
return to pre-1937 jurisprudence. He wrote:
[U]nder commerce, as under due process, adoption of rational basis review expressed the recognition that the Court
had no sustainable basis for subjecting economic regulation
as such to judicial policy judgments, and for the past halfcentury the Court has no more turned back in the direction
of formalistic Commerce Clause review (as in deciding
whether regulation of commerce was sufficiently direct)
than it has inclined toward reasserting the substantive authority of Lochner due process (as in the inflated protection
of contractual autonomy).
There is today, however, a backward glance at both the old
pitfalls, as the Court treats deference under the rationality
rule as subject to gradation according to the commercial or
noncommercial nature of the immediate subject of the challenged regulation ....
Thus, it seems fair to ask whether
the step taken by the Court today does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which
the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago.13 '

130. Id. at 294.
131. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1653-54 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). A more recent decision has led four of the justices to reiterate concern that the Court is intruding on congressional authority. In Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing lawsuits by Indian tribes against
States under the Indian Commerce Clause. Justice Stevens' dissent called the decision
a "shocking" affront to Congress. Id. at 1134. Justice Souter wrote a dissent joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. He observed:
It was the defining characteristic of the Lochner era, and its characteristic vice, that the Court treated the common-law background (in those
days, common-law property rights and contractual autonomy) as paramount, while regarding congressional legislation to abrogate the common
law on these economic matters as constitutional suspect ....
The majority today, indeed, seems to be going Lochner one better.
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D. The Threat from Textualism..2
Just as diminished judicial deference to congressional factfinding undermines Congress' status as the primary source of
statutory law, textualism poses a similar threat because of its
disdain for legislative history. Textualism posits that when
interpreting ambiguous statutory text judges should not use
extraneous sources, such as legislative history. It urges judges
to "rely on the texts themselves-assisted by the structure of
the statutes, the canons of statutory construction, administrative practices under the statutes, comparisons with judicial
interpretations of similar statutory provisions, and the meanings most compatible with ordinary usage and relevant
law." 3
Textualism's threat to Congress is similar to the threat discussed in this Part for several reasons. First, it interferes with
Congress' role as the primary fact-finding and policymaking
arm of government. Much of the content and context of legislative deliberation is reported in legislative history. When interpreting ambiguous statutory language, judges who refuse to
read legislative history can too easily miss important public
policy themes and misconstrue legislative intent. Ultimately,
judicial review that ignores legislative history increases the risk
that judicial preferences will supplant those of Congress.
In addition, textualism challenges Congress' choices about its
own procedures. Since the Constitution's procedural requirements for the passage of legislation are relatively few,"3 most
of the processes by which Congress conducts its business reflect
choices Congress has made. Congress' use of legislative history
Id. at 1176.
132. The points made in this section are presented at length in Muriel Morisey
Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585
(1994).
133. Id. at 588.
134. All statutes must be passed by both the House of Representatives and the
Senate and then either signed by the President or, in the event of presidential veto,
passed again by a supermajority of both the House and the Senate. A third possibility is that the time within which a veto must occur expires without veto action by
the President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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reflects a deliberate decision to complement and supplement
statutory provisions. Textualists have failed to demonstrate that
either Congress or courts confuse the interpretive value of legislative history with the legal effect of statutory language.
Though there are critics of how legislative history comes
about"8 and of how courts use it," 6 these are insufficient
reasons for ignoring it, given Congress' constitutional right to
decide to make legislative history a part of its work product.
Textualists object to legislative history partly because of the
role played in its development by congressional staff and lobbyists. Though it facilitates Congress' deliberations on a wide
range of complex topics, the work that staff and lobbyists do is
no more inherently authoritative than the work of judicial
clerks. A staff member or lobbyist may draft a segment of legislative history, for example, but it gains official status only
when adopted by a legislator. Yet it is no less valid because the
legislator chooses to seek assistance in its development. Similarly, a judicial decision is no less valid or authoritative because it reflects substantial drafting work by a clerk. Congress'
evident desire to rely on staff and lobbyists for assistance is
entitled to judicial respect as the choice of an equal and independent branch of government.
Ultimately, textualism and judicial denigration of congressional fact-finding enhance judicial power at the expense of Congress. Describing the phenomenon in his 1932 critique of judicial exercises of power,"3 7 Louis Boudin wrote:
[In theory] the primary duty of judges is to enforce the law
as made by the Legislature, unless they have a clear mandate from the Constitution itself to the contrary....
Unfortunately, the official theory does not at all tally with
the facts. The actual practice of the courts is to declare any
law unconstitutional of which they strongly disapprove,
whatever the reason of such disapproval, and quite irrespective of the actual provisions of the Constitution, which very

135. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the creation of legislative history).
136. See, e.g., Stephen L. Washy, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A Caveat, 12 J. Pub. L. 262 (1963).
137. Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JuDIcIARY (lst ed. 1932).
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frequently says nothing at all on the subject.... The Constitution has ceased to be the measure of the Judicial Power
or any check or limit to the judges' exercise of the power to
declare legislation unconstitutional.The Judges have become
superior not only to the Legislature but to the Constitution
itself, since the Constitution is what the judges say it
is.'
Antidemocratic attacks on legislative decisionmaking are as
old as the republic.19 The contemporary versions of such attacks highlight the need to monitor and preserve the balance
between the branches of government. This process would benefit
from an inquiry into how effectively Congress is carrying out its
fact-finding and deliberative roles.
II.

CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS AS A USER OF FACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE

Even under the current Court's reduced deference to congressional fact-finding, in most situations, courts only question
whether Congress has articulated a constitutionally sufficient
justification for its action. They do not ask whether Congress
used available knowledge effectively.' But this question merits close attention for several reasons. The potential for farreaching impact on people's lives, the rhetorical claims of efficacy that often accompany congressional action, and the high
fiscal cost of much legislation justify searching nonjudicial inquiries into how Congress uses available knowledge to develop
the factual foundations of its actions. Moreover, since the Supreme Court's review of congressional decisionmaking is increasingly skeptical, Congress should be making its decisions
with increasing care. Congress cannot force the Supreme Court
to change its approach, so some adjustments in congressional
behavior may be in order. This Part urges that the electorate

138. Id. at v-vi.
139. See, e.g, DAVID KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 6 (1993) (ob-

serving that 'There is a deep distrust of democracy in the conservative tradition and
among the framers of the Constitution. The record of the constitutional convention
reflects considerable contempt for ordinary people and popularly elected legislatures.").
140. A useful volume providing historical and comparative perspectives on legislator use of knowledge is KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND THE CONGRESS, supra note 9.
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become a greater force pushing Congress to improve its use of
factual knowledge.
It is important to note how this contrasts with traditional
rational basis judicial review. A court can conclude that a statute survives this level of scrutiny if the court finds during postenactment review that there is some minimal rationality to
Congress' decision. 4 1 Nonjudicial review of congressional action should go further and ask what Congress knew or readily
could have known at the time it was making legislative decisions. The approach urged here is analogous to the concept in
administrative law that an agency's decision may be struck
down by a court if it was arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court has said that an agency must articulate "a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made."
The electorate should question whether Congress'
choices have a rational connection to the available facts as a
means of increasing the likelihood that Congress will make
wise and effective choices.
There are troubling contemporary examples of congressional
failure to make effective use of policy-relevant knowledge.'
However, the ability of affected parties to challenge statutes
through court actions and the ability of voters to defeat legislators with whom they are displeased are insufficient mechanisms
for evaluating and responding to congressional failure in the
use of policy-relevant knowledge. Therefore, the electorate
should take other steps to assess and influence Congress in this
regard.'
As the examples offered in this Part reveal, congressional
failure to make decisions based on effective use of knowledge
typically occurs when political forces drive the adoption of legis-

141. As the discussion of Lopez in Part II.B points out, the Court appears now to
employ the rational basis standard with less deference to Congress. The shift in the
Court's approach increases the need for Congress to demonstrate some factual
foundation for its actions. Note, however, that the Supreme Court's April 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez suggests that rational basis review has become less
deferential.
142. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
143. See infra part III.B. This is not, however, to assert that such actions should
be struck down on constitutional grounds.

144. See infra part IV.
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lation, and when there are no provisions that would lead to
strict judicial scrutiny. These two factors influence congressional
willingness to enact legislation that lacks solid support in available knowledge.
A. Implications for Public Debate and Decisionmaking
When Congress acts, it is usually to advance specific social
policy goals.' Even appropriations bills implicate policy judgments for they reflect congressional choices about how to distribute limited fiscal resources among the wide variety of authorizing statutes.' These legislative actions create in the electorate the appropriate expectation that perceptible results will
flow from Congress' actions.14' Proponents and opponents, both
within and outside of Congress, expect the legislation to make a
difference, for neither support nor opposition would make sense
otherwise." The expectation that congressional action will
make a difference justifies a searching inquiry into how Congress uses available knowledge."
Moreover, virtually every congressional decision carries significant fiscal implications. Congress makes many decisions impli-

145. I use the phrase "social policy" expansively to include, for example, legislation
in the areas of civil rights, welfare, the environment, the economy, health programs,
housing, transportation and research. It also includes virtually all income tax legislation, for such legislation promotes certain distributions and redistributions of wealth
for reasons grounded in policy objectives. Common exceptions to social policy legislation are measures dealing with intra-congressional procedure and technical matters.
146. Congressional process requires that no appropriation measure be adopted until
the funding has been authorized through a separate piece of legislation. See Kate
Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
147. This discussion deliberately sidesteps the vibrant debate about legislative intent as an element of judicial statutory interpretation. See Spence, supra note 132, at
589-93. It presumes instead that for the purposes of this article, congressional statements, whether oral or written, and whether in the legislative history, the statutory
language or informal public discussion, provide a reliable picture of what Congress
intends for the legislation to do.
148. Support or opposition to legislation may be grounded in political motives as
much as in actual expectations about what the legislation will accomplish. A legislator may speak forcefully for or against a particular piece of legislation while doubting
as a practical matter that it will ever be enacted or implemented. Nonetheless, the
legislation must have some potential for making a difference in order for the forces in
either support or opposition to have anything to talk about.
149. The congressional action discussed here includes legislation that passed either
the House, the Senate, or both.
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cating billions of dollars. Decisions that take little account of
the available knowledge about the need for or potential effectiveness of the statutory provisions risk the waste of significant
amounts of money.
The impetus for congressional action often comes from political imperatives that are quite distinct from and may even overwhelm available knowledge. Such political motivations for legislative decision-making are often both inevitable and appropriate. 50 For example, it may have been the urgent need for a
program to speed recovery from the Depression rather than
thoughtful economic analysis that led Congress to enact the
main features of the New Deal. Yet such political motivations
may also be incompatible at times with reasoned
decisionmaking. The actions taken against Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II are good examples. It is
appropriate, therefore, to evaluate the quality of the deliberation that precedes significant congressional decisions.
Information about the potential effects of legislative proposals
is a critical component of informed public debate, congressional
deliberation and public policy-making. Congress' failure to use
knowledge effectively can reinforce misinformation that reaches
the electorate and can compound the risk that the public will
endorse measures that offer scant promise of efficacy. This
reduces the likelihood that Congress' fact-finding resources will
offset the force of uninformed ideas that might otherwise drive
public policy. 5 '

150. A powerful criticism of common law is that it makes claims of objectivity and

rationality that are unwarranted because of the impact of judicial perceptions, biases
and policy preferences. THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys
ed., 1990) is a useful collection of essays on this theme. Proponents of this view have
given relatively little attention to statutory law, but an interesting inquiry (outside
the scope of this discussion) is whether statutory law is vulnerable to a similar critique, or whether instead statutes carry no equivalent implications of objectivity and
rationality because of the inevitable impact of political forces.
151. A recent study of public attitudes about federal spending on foreign policy
revealed that most people guessed the level of expenditure to be 15 times greater
than it actually is. See STEVEN KRULL, PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTUDES (1995). Legislation which comes about through the voter initiative process is
particularly vulnerable to the impact of misinformation or lack of information among
the electorate. A significant advantage of formal legislation is that it is subject to
such screening devices as referral to committee where there is greater potential for
close inspection. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE
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Concerns about the level of knowledge that guides public
policy-making appear in a number of different settings. The
scientific community has become increasingly vocal on this
same point. For example, at a three day June 1995 meeting at
the New York Academy of Sciences, many of the approximately
200 participants expressed alarm at what they called "The
Flight from Science and Reason."'52 They raised the possibility
that democratic processes could be undermined if citizens distrust and avoid using the insights of science, medicine and
technology.' Another observer has complained that, "[Slolid
scientific studies are easily ignored when they give politically
out-of-step answers. ..
The American Bar Association adopted a resolution at its
August 1995 annual meeting calling for governments at all
levels to "take account of all appropriate scientific knowledge
when regulating environmental matters."55 The ABA further
urged that the Executive Branch and Congress should
through administrative and legislative means, as appropriate, provide for a suitable scientific body to undertake the
on-going assessment of the state of scientific environmental
knowledge, the on-going identification of environmental
issues for which research is necessary, the oversight of such
research and the dissemination of environmental scientific
findings and information to [governments, scientists and the
public].15

The sponsors report accompanying the resolution noted that:
Reliable scientific information necessary to respond to environmental issues often is not available. This compromises
government's ability to develop effective policies and make
knowledgeable decisions on environmental matters....
L.J. 1503 (1990).

152. Malcolm W. Brown, Scientists Deplore Flights from Reason, N.Y. TIMEs, June
6, 1995, at C1.
153. Id.
154. Stephen M. Meyer, The Role of Scientists in the "New Politics," CHRON. oF
HIGHER EDUC., May 26, 1995, at B1. Mr. Meyer is a professor of political science.
155. ABA Res. 119 (1995) (submitted to the House of Delegates by the Standing
Committee on Environmental Law and the Section of Natural Resources, Energy and
Environmental Law).
156. Id.
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Some governmental action must be taken to remove the
burden on the legal system resulting from inefficiency and
uncertainty arising from the absence of reliable scientific
information on environmental matters. The present recommendation highlights the need for reliable scientific data as
the basis for increasingly complex environmental
decisionmaking and encourages appropriate steps to be
taken at all levels of government in support of this goal."
There are a number of perspectives on how legislators should
make decisions.'58 According to one view, legislators carry out
their appropriate democratic functions when they do what their
constituents want, rather than relying on the views of other
interested parties. Thus, statutory law takes its legitimacy from
the fact that it represents the will of majority, not from the
extent or quality of any articulated reasons. Proponents of the
public choice theory of legislative deliberation view legislation
as the product of negotiated compromises growing out of the
interplay of lobbying by private interest groups and judgments
by legislators about how votes will affect the goal of reelection.'5 9 Each of these perspectives allows for the likelihood
that legislators will sometimes respond to forces other than the
persuasive value of rational arguments and empirical knowledge.
The assertion made here that Congress should engage in
more reason-based decision making is not intended to take
issue with either perspective. The purpose here is to highlight
the importance of thoughtful and well-informed decisions. An
ill-advised statute may be entirely legitimate in the sense that
the public is bound by its dictates. In other words, legislation
may conform to the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring Congress to act rationally and in
the interest of legitimate purposes, yet still be of dubious
wisdom. 6 It may have the legitimacy that comes with

157. Id. (Executive Summary).
158. Professors Hetzel, Libonati and Williams provide an overview of these perspectives. See HETZEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 189-192.
159. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Symposium on the Theory of
Public Choice: Legislation Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988) (giving
a summary of public choice theory as it applies to legislative decisionmaking).
160. The extent to which legislation derives its legitimacy from adherence to formal processes is the subject of enduring scholarly interest. See, e.g., Linde, supra,
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majoritarian support or reflect deliberate consensus building
among interested constituencies. But, the electorate is better
served by statutes that, in addition, reflect Congress' well-informed deliberations. Congress is more likely to spend the
electorate's collective resources more wisely, and achieve more
of its hoped-for policy goals.
Perhaps Congress should not be expected to be more careful
in its use of information and facts than the electorate by which
it was chosen. One observer of how the public uses information
notes, for example, that most people have little understanding
of how to distinguish useful facts from mere anecdotes. 6 ' But
any suggestion that Congress, as the democratically elected
legislature, is as free as the electorate to use information unwisely is misguided. It overlooks the fact that significant public
resources go to making the best knowledge available to Congress, and that Congress' decisions determine the content and
cost of programs that spend taxpayer dollars. It is appropriate
to expect that Congress will make decisions that reflect careful
deliberation even if people sometimes fail to do so in their private lives.
Substantial polling research provides evidence that the public
is already deeply disaffected with Congress.' 62 Legislative
judgments that lack sound and well-articulated bases in pertinent knowledge may add to that disaffection." They may
even foster disrespect for the entire legal system if unwise
legislative choices rob the electorate of any residual belief that
the laws under which they live, and the programs of which
they are the purported beneficiaries, reflect thoughtful decisions
by well-informed decisionmakers.
Moreover, one can envision political costs associated with
congressional adherence to the wishes of a relatively unin-

note 2.
161. See JOHN A. PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER (1995); JOHN
A PAULOS, INNUMERACY (1988).

162. A May 1996 Wall Street Journal/NBC News Poll found that 68% disapproved
of how Congress was doing its job. James Pinkerton, A New Outsider Is Born: Bob
Dole, NEWSDAY at A39 (May 19, 1996).
163. It is not clear that the polls ask questions that pinpoint whether disaffection
with Congress is related to disappointment with the results of legislation. This would
be an interesting area for further inquiry.
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formed electorate or the demands of particular interest groups
if the resulting legislation falls short of achieving public expectations. For example, if claims that certain legislation will reduce crime go unrealized, the electorate might not be mollified
by the fact the Congress enacted popular, though ineffective,
legislation. Similarly, the defense that the legislation enjoyed
strong support from powerful interest groups might not protect
Congress from hostile public reactions. And even if the legislation successfully achieved some purposes, the electorate would
still be justified in objecting to its failure to achieve major goals
promised at the outset."
The electorate has expectations of what will happen in the
wake of congressional action and reacts when those expectations are frustrated. For example, critics of the current welfare
system often complain that it is a failure.'65 Since they cannot
mean that benefits are not being distributed under the programs, they must be objecting to something about how it is
working. In other words, there is an expectation about the
welfare system that these critics believe is not being fulfilled.
They may feel, for example, that they were promised that the
welfare system would reduce the number of people living in
poverty, which has not happened. 6 ' The problem and the political costs are likely to be most acute when legislators are
making express claims about what the legislation will accomplish. Thus, making decisions with the full benefit of relevant
knowledge about the likely effects of its legislation is in
Congress' own best interests.' 7
164. For example, when supporters of anti-crime legislation talk about its value in
reducing crime, they may choose not to articulate openly any punitive or revenge
motives they hold. Enactment of the legislation could satisfy those motives while
having no demonstrable effect on the occurrence of crime. See infra Part llI.B (discussing crime legislation).
165. For example, during Senate Finance Committee hearings on welfare revision
proposals, one witness began his testimony by referring to "the need to reform our
failed social-welfare system." He went on, "In discussing welfare reform it is important to understand the magnitude of the failure that has been our welfare policy."
Hearing on Welfare Revision Before the Senate Finance Comm., 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of Michael Tanner, Director of Health and Welfare Studies,
The Cato Institute) [hereinafter Tanner Testimony]; see also 141 CONG. REc. S11,746
(daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Gramm).
166. Tanner also said that "the United States has spent more than $3.5 trillion
trying to ease the plight of the poor. Yet, today, the poverty rate is actually slightly
higher than when we started." Tanner Testimony, supra note 165.
167. Congress may also suffer from the comparison of our expectations of the par-
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It may, at times, be in Congress' best interests for its stat-

utes to leave important issues either unresolved or delegate
them to the States or localities for decision. This can be motivated in part by the wish to dissipate political accountability
and in part by the wish to have programs that are tailored to
local or regional needs. For example, current welfare reform
debates include discussion of whether and to what extent key
decisions should be left to the States.
On the other hand, Congress may sometimes delegate matters to administrative agencies with broad grants of authority.
For example, Congress may choose to delegate to agencies matters that call for special expertise. Setting acceptable standards
for workplace exposure to toxic substances is a key
example.'
In each of these situations, the application of
available factual knowledge by statute could subject Congress to
risks of political accountability that it would prefer to deflect to
agencies or nonfederal entities. But Congress should make such
strategic choices with an awareness of the available knowledge,
not despite it.
An objection to the assertions in this Part is that if the Supreme Court is truly disdainful of congressional fact-finding,
then the quality of that fact-finding and the extent to which it
is articulated become irrelevant. This view should be rejected
for at least three reasons. First, we should take the Court at
its word when it asserts that strict scrutiny need not lead to
the striking down of all statutes subject to that level of review.
Second, to the extent that the Court's approaches in Adarand
and Lopez are part of a pattern of judicial disdain for Congress,'69 they merit a response by Congress and the electorate
that includes thoughtful assessment of congressional practices.
Finally, taking the view that the Supreme Court has made the

ties in other legal contexts. For example, we require civil litigants to shoulder certain
burdens of providing support for their core contentions (the requirement that a prima
fade case be made in order for a claim to go forward, for example) and to prove
their contentions by specified standards (such as the preponderance of the evidence).
At a time when public regard for Congress is quite low, the legal reasons why Congress is not subject to the same evidentiary and proof requirements as private litigants may not be enough to preserve public support for legislative decisions that are
uninformed or ineffective.
168. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
169. See supra part II.
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quality of congressional fact-finding irrelevant would lead to a

troubling indifference among the electorate to the quality of
public debate and decision making.
B. Contemporary Examples
Congress has recently made choices that suggest indifference
to or disdain for policy-relevant knowledge. Even when the
knowledge comes from research carried out by federal agencies
or is federally funded, Congress too often appears willing to
ignore its results. The examples offered here are striking examples of legislative actions supported by little or no evidence that
they will be effective responses to the problems they purport to
solve. 70 They support the conclusion that Congress sometimes
adopts legislation for reasons that outweigh any inclination to
draw upon available policy-relevant knowledge.' 7 '
1. Crime Legislation-Evidence on Deterrence
The most recent federal crime legislation, The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,72 was supported
by the President 73 and by significant majorities of both parties in the House and Senate. 7 4 Key features of that legislation included harsher sentences and the expansion of the death
penalty to more crimes.'75 There is little evidence that either
170. While these examples are drawn from the social policy agenda of the new
Republican majority in Congress, the described legislative behaviors can occur across
the political spectrum.
171. Sometimes Congress acts in the face of contradictory policy-relevant research
and conclusions. This is not necessarily unwise or inappropriate. Making tough choices is Congress' policy-making job. Congress and the electorate might benefit, however,
if Congress acknowledged more readily those situations in which it must make policy
judgments in the face of factual or scientific uncertainty.
172. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§
13,701-14,223 (1995)).
173. For example, the President praised the legislation in a news conference, 30
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1697 (Aug. 21, 1994), and in a letter urging the Senate to
enact it, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1701 (Aug. 22, 1994).
174. Final congressional action on the legislation came on votes to adopt the
House-Senate Conference Report. It passed the House of Representatives on August
21, 1994 by a vote of 235 to 195 140 CoNG. REC. H9005 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994). It
passed the Senate on August 25, 1994 by a vote of 61 to 38. 140 CONG. REC.
S12,600 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1995).
175. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 320,101 (in-
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approach is an effective crime deterrent, but the political rhetoric calling for the legislation was replete with claims that it
would prevent crime.
a. Evidence on Deterrence

176

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice concluded that measures directed
expressly at crime and criminals could have little effect without
much larger simultaneous efforts being directed at crime's underlying social and economic causes. Its report concluded, in
part:
The Commission ...

has no doubt whatever that the most

significant action that can be taken against crime is action
designed to eliminate slums and ghettos, to improve education, to provide jobs.... We will not have dealt effectively
with crime 17until
we have alleviated the conditions that
7
stimulate it.

In 1978, the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research
on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects said "we cannot assert
that the evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion regarding
deterrence." 78 A 1991 U.S. Sentencing Commission report to
creased penalties), 60,005-024 (additional crimes subject to the death penalty).
176. Each of the examples cited is either a public document, a document reporting
on publicly funded research or research readily available in public or university
libraries. Therefore, there is no doubt that each cited source was available to
Congress.
177. PRESIDENT'S COMMIWSSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 15 (1967).
178. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERI-

CA 19 (1995) (quoting National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research on Deterrent
and Incapacitative Effects). The principal consultant, Daniel Nagin of Carnegie-Mellon
University, also wrote, "The evidence is woefully inadequate for providing a good
estimate of the magnitude of whatever effect may exist.... Policy-makers in the
criminal justice system are done a disservice if they are left with the impression that
the empirical evidence . . . strongly supports the deterrence hypothesis." Id. at 19; see
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION (Blumstein et al., eds. 1975). At the 1991 Attorney
General's Crime Summit, Steven D. Dillingham, then director of the Department of
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics asserted: "statisticians and criminal justice researchers have consistently found that falling crime rates are associated with rising
imprisonment rates," citing the 1978 National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research
on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects. Id. at 20. However this claim may have been
a distortion of the Panel's findings. Id.
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Congress on mandatory minimum sentences recommended their
repeal.'79 A 1993 National Academy of Sciences report commissioned by the Department of Justice noted that average
prison time per violent crime had tripled between 1975 and
1989, and concluded that increasing the prison population had
very little effect on levels of violent crime. 80
The evidence before Congress relating specifically to the deterrent effect of the death penalty was also, at best, inconclusive.'81 Proponents of the death penalty provisions relied on
anecdotal evidence to support their assertions that it would
deter crime.' 82 Senator Arlen Specter's statements were typical. Saying that "the experience has been that the death penalty is an effective deterrent against crimes of violence,""s he
described one incident that occurred when he was the district
attorney of Philadelphia.'

The study was referred to during the congressional debate on the 1994 crime
legislation on at least one occasion. See 140 CONG. REC. S200-02 (1994) (remarks of
Sen. Simon).
179. The report was transmitted to Congress on September 11, 1991. See 137
CONG. REC. H6450 (1991).
180. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE
292-94 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth, eds. 1993).
181. Senator Specter, an ardent and vocal supporter of the death penalty provisions conceded when he introduced legislation to expand the death penalty that "the
studies go both ways" with respect to its deterrent effect. 139 CONG. REC. S853
(1993) (statement of Sen. Specter).
182. Although there were three earlier studies that appeared to support the deterrence hypothesis (Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. (1975); David P. Phillips, The Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, AM. J. OF SOC.
139 (1980); Stephen K Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the
United States Tile Series Evidence, 51 S. ECON. J. 68 (1985)); each had been rebutted by other research: Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Murder and Capital
Punishment in the United States: The Question of Deterrence IN WILLIAM J.
CHAMBiSS, CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION 435-48 (2d ed. 1984). Kenneth C. Haas &
James A. Inciardi, Lingering Doubts About a Popular Punishment in CHALLENGING
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 11-28 (Kenneth C.
Haas & James A.- Inciardi, eds. 1988); James A. Fox & Michael L. Radelet, Persistent
Flaws in Econometric Studies of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 23 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 29 (1989). During consideration of the 1994 legislation, none of the supporters of the death penalty provisions cited any studies supporting the deterrence
theory.
183. 139 Cong. Rec. S15,731 (1993).
184. Id. He also referred to the similar experiences of other prosecutors. Id. Some
days earlier Senator Specter had introduced into the record information about other
specific instances in which people arrested for violent crimes had asserted their be-
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The evidence before Congress that the death penalty has
little or no deterrent effect was substantial. For example, opponents of the crime legislation's death penalty provisions provided statistics showing that crime rates in States which have the
death penalty are no lower than those which do not.'
Despite the evidence, the rhetoric accompanying the crime
legislation contained numerous claims that the legislation's
tougher penalty- provisions would help stop crime.186 For example, Representative Hoyer stated during the debate on passage of the Conference Report:
That is what this bill is about. Protecting our families.
Putting more police ensuring our streets. Ensuring that our
children are safe from the violence that plagues too many of
our communities.
This bill will punish criminals.
This bill will prevent crime from happening in the first
place. That is what the American people want from this
legislation. This is what they demand that we do. 87
One of the Senators supporting the legislation stated that the
bill, will "toughen penalties, it will prevent crimes, and it will
support law enforcement.""
Congressional deliberation focused for a time on a provision
called the Racial Justice Act,"8 9 a proposal to establish procedures to guard against racially discriminatory imposition of the
death penalty. Because its supporters wanted it included in the
larger crime bill, the Racial Justice Act became a centerpiece of
the crime bill debate about the death penalty. Many argued
that the death penalty deters crime. For example, Representa-

havior was affected by fear of the death penalty. 139 CONG. REC. S15,048-50 (1993).
185. See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REC. S15,996 (1993); 140 CONG. REc. H9002 (1994); 140
CONG. REC. S12,543 (1994).
186. During congressional consideration of the legislation, much debate centered on
whether crime prevention was best accomplished by programs aimed at underlying
social factors, such as youth unemployment. See, e.g. 140 CONG. REC. S12,267 (1994)
(statement of Sen. Hatch); 140 CONG. REC. S12,271 (1994) (statement of Sen.

Mikulsli).
187. CONG. REC. H8,674-75 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
188. 140 CoNG. REC. S12,531 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
189. H.R. 4017, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
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tive Newt Gingrich 9 ° stated "[A]ll of us are trying to protect

the innocent. We want to stop the next 100,000 murders. We
want to stop the murderer.... Those of use who believe in the

death penalty and believe in an effective and believable death
penalty are, in fact, committed to trying to protect innocent"
Americans.19 During Senate deliberations on the measure,
Senator Arlen Specter said, "There is a consensus in America,
not only reflected in the votes in the Congress, with more than
70 percent of this body in favor of the death penalty, but in the
percentage of the American people who believe that the death
penalty is an effective deterrent." 2
As Senator Specter's remark demonstrates, the death penalty
(and other enhanced penalty provisions) have substantial political support that offsets, for many legislators, the weight of the
evidence.'93
2. Welfare Reform
The welfare reform proposals adopted by both the House and
Senate"' reflected the belief in Congress that one way to limit
the number of welfare recipients is to deny additional benefits
to children born to mothers already in the welfare program. For
example, one congressional supporter for such changes said
[t]he Republican reform bill takes aim at the heart of the
welfare problem-the underage mother who enters the welfare rolls after conceiving an out-of-wedlock child. Our re-

190. He had not yet assumed the post of Speaker.
191. 140 CONG. REc. H2580 (1994) (referring twice to an "effective" death penalty).
192. 140 CONG. REc. S5342 (1994).
193. There are other features of the crime legislation that may not be supported
by the available evidence. These include the "three strikes and you're out" provision
that mandates prison without parole upon the third felony conviction. See WENDY
KAMINER, ITs ALL THE RAGE 176-239 (1995). Kaminer points out that Senators Biden
and Hatch both acknowledged during congressional debate that the enhanced penalties provisions would have doubtful impact. Id. at 196 (quoting 140 CONG. REC.
S15,384 (Nov. 9, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden & Sen. Hatch)).
194. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, ("An Act to
restore the American family, reduce illegitimacy, control welfare spending and reduce
welfare dependency.") bill would require states to deny welfare checks to children
born to mothers already receiving welfare. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103
(1995). The bill was adopted after a House-Senate Conference (H. Rept. 430, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess.) The President vetoed the legislation on January 6, 1996.
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form denies benefits to those who continue to have children
without having
any means to independently support those
195
children.

There is virtually no evidence, however, to support the claim
that welfare benefits affect significantly the decision to have a
child. For example, the American Psychological Association
submitted testimony that reviewed and summarized the relevant research on the hypothesis that welfare benefits provide
economic incentives for adolescents to give birth out-of-wedlock.
The testimony stated:
While there is not complete unanimity of opinion among
researchers on this question, two relatively recent reviews
of the welfare incentive literature conclude that welfare
benefits do not serve as a reasonable explanation for variations in pregnancy and childbearing rates among unmarried
adolescents.
In response to the public debate over the policy implications
of presumed "incentive effect" for teen pregnancy, a group of
77 poverty researchers signed a statement ['Welfare and
Out-of-Wedlock Births: A Research Summary," 1994] asserting that the accumulated research indicates that "welfare has not played a major role in the rise of out-of-wedlock childbearing."
The group includes several researchers whose work is often
cited in support of restrictive welfare proposals (Plotnick
and Ozawa).195
This testimony went unrefuted in the congressional debates
and was not mentioned in the Committee Reports, except by
legislators writing dissenting views on the legislation containing

195. 141 CONG. REC. H3793 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Funderburk).
196. Strategies for Reducing Adolescent Nonmarital Pregnancy: Appropriate Policy
Responses Before the House of Representatives Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of the American Psychological
Association). Other witnesses supporting the same conclusion based on their own
research included Rebecca Maynard, Senior Fellow, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
(Teenage Childbearing and Welfare Reform Before the Senate Finance Committee,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)) and Robert C. Granger, Senior Vice President, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (Welfare Revision Before the Senate Finance Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)).
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provisions to limit benefits to women who have other children
while on welfare.'97
Like the crime provisions, the welfare proposals have popular
appeal that outweighs their lack of support in the available research. 9 '
3. Other Issues
The two examples cited above illustrate how -legislation can
gain widespread legislative support despite substantial research-based reasons to doubt that it is well-designed to achieve
its stated aims. There are other examples that show the potential for such ill-advised decisionmaking.
a. Tort Reform
Some of the tort reform proposals pending in Congress are
promoted as needed responses to excessive use of the tort liability system, with its attendant costs in legal fees and huge financial settlements for tort victims.'99 Legislation passed by
the House
and Senate would limit punitive awards in all civil
0
cases.

20

Research from the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics underscores the need for careful questioning about
the underlying premises of the tort liability reform legislation.
A study released in July 1995 concluded that of 762,000 civil
cases, punitive damages were201awarded in only 364 of the
12,000 cases that went to trial.
In addition, two recent scholarly examinations of tort liability
laws and policies, while not taking positions on the merits of

197. H.R. REP. No. 104-75, 104TH CONG., 1st Sess. (1995).
198. The President vetoed the legislation. See supra note 194.
199. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H2661 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1995) (statement by Rep.
Goss); 141 CONG. REC. S6321 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement by Sen. Coats); 141
CONG. REC. S6045 (daily ed. May 3, 1995) (statement by Sen. Abraham).
200. The Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1996, 104th Cong., 2d
Sess. was vetoed by the President on May 2, 1996. The House of Representatives
sustained the veto on May 9, 1996.
201. BuREAu oF JUSTICE STATISTICS (1995).
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any particular proposals, raise serious questions about the extent to which current congressional deliberations take adequate
account of available knowledge and significant unknown factors.
For example, one observer, writing about medical malpractice,
comments:
The extensive studies of medical records of hospitalized
patients in the 1970s and 1980s provided surprising answers to the question of whether there were too many medical malpractice claims filed in a tort system that allows
compensation based only on proof of negligence. The answer
was that many more negligent acts occur in medical practice than ever give rise to lawsuits. Rather than joining a
debate marked by much heat and little light, we need answers to the following factual questions:.... To what extent do juries or judges award damages that are excessive
or inadequate? ...

Does the contingent fee system promote

or retard effective evaluation and representation of injured
consumers? .

.

. What effect would an award of attorneys'

fees to the prevailing party have on meaningful access to
the judiciary system by patients or health care providers?
What effect do caps on noneconomic losses or total awards
have on the goal of fair and adequate compensation to victims of medical negligence? Is the tort system a major contributor to inadequate access to medical care on the part of
any segment of the community? ...
Answers to these questions are so critical to rational
policy making that lawmakers should insist that proponents
and opponents of tort reform come forward with relevant
data.0 2
Another commentator has asserted:
[T]he current call for major pro-defendant changes to tort
doctrine ...

rests on a host of unstated and often question-

able assumptions, value preferences that are often at odds
with contemporary norms regarding injury compensations,
and a considerable measure of profit-motivated self-interest.
The claims of tort reformers also depend on undocumented
factual assertions, many of which, when closely examined,

202. FRANK M. McCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TAcTIcs, AND ETHICS 92
(1994). These passages refer to themes that arise often in the current legislative
debate about tort reform.
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are contrary to common sense. Tort reform is thus very
much a house of cards, lots of ingenuity, little substance. It
is, however, dangerously seductive, because it offers a convenient scapegoat for the rising costs of accident compensation, because it feeds into legislative desires for quick fixes,
and because it is so effectively reinforced by political lobbying and campaign contributions of large corporations and
insurers. The trial-lawyer apologists for the status quo are
of course no less self-interested, no less averse to political
lobbying. But between these groups there is no spirit of
compromise, and the danger is that we will either do nothing or jump headlong into measures that will repeal too
much of the progress of the common law.
Some reform is needed, but it must be selective and
deliberate, resting on a careful assessment of the arguments
for and against limits on liability or compensation. 3

b. Health Care Workers Infected with HIV
In July 1991, the Senate passed legislation that would make
it a federal crime for any health care worker infected with the
HIV virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) to treat patients without disclosing their HIV status.
Violators would be subject to a $10,000 fine and a ten-year jail
sentence.2
The provision had not been the subject of any
congressional hearings. Moreover, the Centers for Disease Control was in the process of publishing guidelines for procedures
by infected health care workers, but the CDC proposal deliberately stopped short of requiring patient notification. 5 The
medical literature suggests that the risk of transmission of the
virus from health care worker to patient is extremely remote. 0 6 The risk of transmittal by health care workers of the
203. MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY AND
TORT REFORM 4-5 (1995).
204. Amendment 734 to the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President and Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal year 1992, CONG. REc.
S10,331-348 (1991) Representative Dannemeyer (R-Ca.) introduced similar legislation,
H.R. 2788, the Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Provider Act of 1991, on June
26, 1991, but the legislation was never enacted by the House. 137 CONG. REc. E237677, H5203-08 (1991).
205. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmissions of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During ExposureProne Invasive Procedures 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (1991).
206. For a discussion of the available medical evidence and the political and legal
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hepatitis-B virus is projected to be 100 times greater, for example, yet there has been no comparable legislative effort involving that virus." '
The impact of political forces on the legislation is revealed, in
part, by the fact that during congressional debate on the measure, Senator Helms reported that a June 20, 1991 Gallup poll
indicated more than ninety percent of those polled believed that
HIV-infected health care workers should be required to disclose
the condition to their patients.0 8
The House did not adopt similar legislation and the HIVinfected health care workers provision was deleted when the
House and Senate Conference met on the legislation which included this provision."°9 However, Senate passage of the provision is troubling by itself because congressional procedure permitted the House and Senate Conferees, if they so chose, to
retain the provision without the need for any additional deliberation.
These examples illustrate that the need for concern about
congressional action without substantial research-based support
occurs in a wide range of subject areas.2 10

issues relating to HIV infection, see, e.g., American Bar Association AIDS Coordinating Committee, Calming the AIDS Phobia: Legal Implications of the Low Risk of
Transmitting HIV in the Health Care Setting, 28 MICH. J.L. REFORM 733 (1995);
Burris, HIV-Infected Health Care Workers: The Restoration of Professional Authority, 5
ARCH. FAM. MED. 102 (1996); Leonard H. Glantz, et al., Risky Business: Setting Public Health Policy for HIV-infected Health Care Professionals, 70 MILBANK Q. 43 (1992);
Laurie M. Roberts et al., 122 ANN. INT. MED. 654 (1995).
207. See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. S10,357 (1991) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
208. 137 CONG. REc. S10,334 (1991) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
209. H. Rept. 102-234, 102nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1992).
210. There are at least two other policy areas in which available data may not be
getting appropriate attention. In a fall 1995 report, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention provided data suggesting that the incidence of first-time pregnancy
among teenagers may be declining. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH INFORMATION: STATE SPECIFIC PREGNANCY AND BIRTH RATES AMONG TEENAGERS-UNITED STATES, 1991-92. See also Rene Denfeld, Teen Pregnancy 'Epidemic' is
Hyperbole, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 1996, at A17.
Recent studies undermine the factual basis for the exclusion of homosexuals
from military service. See, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND MILITARY SUITABmIY (1988); PRESERVICE ADJUSTMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL AND HETEROSEXUAL MILITARY ACCESSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE SUITABILITY (1989); Between Logic and Politics: Incisive Rand Study on Homosexuals/Military, LA. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1993, at B7.
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C. Litigation and ElectoralAction Are Not Enough
Neither litigation nor the electoral processes are sufficient
means of evaluating whether Congress has made choices that
reflect wise deliberation and incorporate available relevant
knowledge. Litigation is almost always both expensive and
time-consuming. Few individuals can undertake the arduous
task of challenging federal laws and many of the organizations
that do so operate on limited budgets. Moreover, there are
numerous constraints on access to judicial review in the federal
courts, including limitations on standing to bring certain
actions. In addition, few lawsuits raise questions about the
extent or quality of congressional deliberation. Most focus instead on the particular impact of the legislation on the complaining parties.21 '
Nor is it enough that voters can, at the next election, defeat
incumbents with whom they are displeased. This right permits
displeased voters to oust particular Representatives or Senators
but has little utility as a mechanism for evaluating what the
legislature is accomplishing collectively. In each congressional
election, voters will choose only one representative, and at most
one Senator.2 2 Each constituency's power to vote legislators
out of office does not operate as the collective power to evaluate
or dislodge Congress. The electorate should exercise alternative
ways of monitoring congressional decisionmaking.

211. This is a requirement in most statutes authorizing judicial review of agency
actions. The Administrative Procedure Act, for example, provides that "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
Administrative Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). Because the statute expressly states that it does not apply to Congress, it does not authorize judicial review
of congressional decisionmaking. Id.
212. Although each state has two Senators, they are not elected at the same time.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Steps Congress Should Take
1. Statutory Findings
Since Congress can control neither the Supreme Court's determinations about which level of review to employ nor the way
the Court will conduct its review, Congress' best hope of having
its statutes survive judicial scrutiny is to make clear that they
are solidly grounded in relevant knowledge. While statutory
findings are not and should not be constitutionally necessary," they may serve Congress as a way of putting before
courts the documented support for proposed legislation.214 At
the same time, through greater use of statutory findings Congress may become more likely to develop thoughtful responses
to the kinds of questions the electorate should be asking about
proposed legislation.
Committee reports and floor colloquies are weaker means of
achieving this focus on available knowledge for at least two
reasons. The first is that these elements of legislative history
do not make each legislator as fully accountable to the electorate. Only Committee Members voting in the majority and the
actual participants in floor colloquies necessarily accept responsibility for reports and floor debate content.215 Second, the
statutory language is more likely to be read by lawyers and
others trying to understand the legislation and by judges engaged in its interpretation. Putting the findings in the statutes
themselves will mean that they will be more widely read. This

213. "Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of
the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review."
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
214. See Christopher J. Sprigman, Standing on Firmer Ground: Separation of Powers and Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing Analysis, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1645 (1992) (arguing for deference to congressional findings of fact regarding
causation and redressability).
215. This is consistent with one of the valid points made by textualists: that the
statutory language itself is the most authoritative. Textualists claim it is the only
authoritative legislative text, a point with which I disagree. This is discussed at
length in Spence, supra note 132, at 591-612.
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should carry with it an extra sense of responsibility for ensuring that the findings reflect thoughtful deliberation.
Congress certainly uses statutory findings now,216 but there
are striking instances of legislation with major policy implications which have no statutory findings. For example, o f t h e
590 statutes enacted during the 102d Congress, 112 included
sections expressly designated as "Findings," 148 had quasi-findings-factual statements for the enactment of the law (usually
employed with proclamations) and 330 had no findings at all.
Of the 210 statutes enacted during the first session of the 103d
Congress, 37 included findings, 50 included 'quasi-findings" and
123 had no findings." Those with no findings included a
number that made significant changes to existing law or established significant new programs."'
It is important to acknowledge there is no way to guarantee
that even statutory findings will be solidly grounded in knowledge. The original impetus for this article came during work on
legislation to promote volunteerism that was enacted in
1990.219 The legislation as passed by the Senate contained
several express statutory findings, one of which had no support
in either the hearing record or the congressional debate."0

216. Both of the tort reform bills mentioned in supra Part III.B.3.a and the welfare reform legislation discussed supra Part III.B.2 contain statutory findings. The
crime legislation discussed supra Part III.B.1 does not.
217. My research assistant, Lisa Barton, was entrusted with the task of reviewing
every piece of legislation enacted by the 102d Congress and the first session of the
103d Congress. These data are the result of her efforts.
218. For example, in the 103rd Congress, First Session, the National Institutes of
Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300ff (1994), established the requirement that the NIH develop review and approval procedures for NIH-funded research, created an Office of Scientific Integrity and authorized significant medical
research initiatives. The authorized funding for the National Cancer Institute alone
was more than $2.2 billion; The FBI Access to Telephone Records Act, Pub. L. No.
103-142, 107 Stat. 1491 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 270 (b),(e)) authorized the FBI to
obtain certain telephone subscriber records without a court order or subpoena for its
use in foreign counterintelligence and international terrorism investigations. In the
102d Congress, the Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106
Stat. 264-66 (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.) made significant
changes in copyright law; the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102521, 106 Stat. 3403, 18 U.S.C. 228 note, authorized new measures to permit the
enforcement of court-approved child support agreements.
219. The National and Community Service Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,501-12,682
(1994).
220. In 1989, while serving as Director of Policy Analysis in the Harvard
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The Senate-passed bill said that, "the cost of higher education,
loan indebtedness, and the high price of housing deter many
young adults from volunteering for VISTA and other service
programs that involve a substantial time commitment."22 ' No
witnesses spoke to this issue, either in favor of the proposition
or against it.' The express findings do not appear in the final legislation, but their presence in the Senate-passed bill
illustrates some congressional willingness to be careless even
with statutory findings.
Similarly, Congress could, for example, incorporate into crime
legislation the "finding" that the death penalty deters crime
despite the dearth of empirical support for this proposition.
Recent tort reform legislation illustrates the potential problem.
H.R. 956, the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of
1995, includes in its congressional findings:
The unpredictability of damage awards is inequitable to
both plaintiffs and defendants and has added considerably
to the high cost of liability insurance, making it difficult for
producers, consumers, volunteers and nonprofit organizawith any
tions insurers to protect themselves from liability
2

degree of confidence and at a reasonable cost. "

This assertion may not reflect the facts with respect to the

need for legislation.2" While some witnesses supported this

claim, others presented research data from several studies directly challenging the factual premises of the finding. Some of
these data came from research by Congress' General Accounting

Office."r
University's Office of Government, Community and Public Affairs, I engaged in a

detailed review of the pending national service legislation. With the help of my research assistant, John Emerson, I reviewed the congressional testimony on the legislation, and the committee reports. Hearings were held by the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources on March 9th, 14th and 20th and April 21st of 1989.
221. The National and Community Service Act of 1990, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2
(1990), was passed by the Senate March 1, 1990. 136 CONG. REc. 3167 (1990).
222. There was some research circulating among interested parties about how
education loan indebtedness appeared to influence post-college employment options,
but this did not address the question of volunteerism. SANDY BAUM & SAUL
ScHWARTZ, THE IMPACT OF STUDENT LOANS ON BORROWERS: CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
AND ATITUDES TOwARDS REPAYMENT (1988).

223. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(7).
224. See RAHDERT, supra note 203.
225. See HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., Hearing of Feb. 13, 1995 (testimony of Thomas
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Similarly, S. 454, The Health Care Liability Reform and
Quality Assurance Act of 1995, as reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources contains the findings
that "the civil justice system of the United States is a costly
and inefficient mechanism for resolving claims of health care
liability and compensating injured patients."226
Some testimony presented in hearings on this legislation
supported this conclusion, 27 but the Committee also received
testimony on studies contradicting this finding, including one by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and one by
the Congressional Budget Office." 8
Despite this evidence that statutory findings may not reflect
a full picture of the available knowledge, they are a valuable
mechanism. It would have been helpful, for example, for the
minority contractor set-aside at issue in Fullilove to have included some express congressional findings about discrimination
in the granting of construction contracts. Even though the
Court concluded that the necessary factual predicate for the setaside existed,2 29 the fate of the statute was made more doubtful by the brevity of Congress' deliberations on the set-aside
and its failure to speak more clearly to its reasons for enacting
the specific provision. Justice Stevens' dissent in Fullilove emphasized this point.2 3
The City of Richmond's failure to develop more detailed findings before enacting its set-aside ordinance may be attributable
in part to Congress' reliance on findings that were not expressly articulated and specific to the set-aside. The City of
Eaton); SENATE COMMERCE CoMM., Hearing of April 3, 1995 (testimony of Robert
Hunter); SENATE COMMERCE COMM., Hearing of April 4, 1995 (testimony of Jonathan
S. Massey). See infra part IV.A.2 (discussing congressional use of research from the
General Accounting Office).
226. S. Rept. 104-83, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1995).
227. See, e.g., Healthcare Liability Revisions Before the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Thomas Scully,
President and CEO, Federation of American Health Systems).
228. See Health Care Liability Reform and Quality Assurance Before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995 (testimony of
Laura Wittkin); see also infra part IV.A.2 (discussing the Office of Technology Assess-

ment).
229. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing Fullilove
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
230. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 552-554; see also Days, supra note 68 at 457-63.

v.
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Richmond's set-aside was modeled so closely after the congressional statute that it even included Eskimos and Aleuts as
benefitted groups even though there was no evidence they were
present in the Richmond population."' The plurality opinion
in Croson cited these inclusions as evidence of the city's failure
to establish a sufficient factual predicate for the race specificity
in its ordinance. 2 If Congress' own steps to enactment had
included the adoption of express findings, the City of Richmond
might have been more likely to examine the suitability of the
congressional language for its local circumstances. This is admittedly a speculative point. Nevertheless, congressional statutes probably will always be a source of language for nonfederal entities and more deliberate use of findings would be useful
for that additional reason.
The circumstances leading up to the decision in Lopez'
provide another example of how congressional findings might be
used. While the case was moving through the courts, but before
the Supreme Court made its decision, Congress amended the
statute under review to state explicitly the impact of guns at
schools in interstate commerce.2 The Court chose not to take
those findings into account and such findings should not be a
necessary predicate for legislation." Still, they can be a useful resource for courts. As Justice Souter remarked, 'They may,
in fact, have great value in telling courts what to look for, in

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 12-156(a) (1985).
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989).
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
Pub. L. No. 103-222 § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (1994).
See supra part III.B.
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establishing at least one frame of reference for review," 6 and
in citing to factual authority."237
Finally, the threat from textualism is yet another reason for
Congress to use statutory findings more frequently and more
thoughtfully. Even the most ardent textualist is likely to take
into account Congress' factual context for legislation if it is the
statutory language. 8
2. Other Options for Congress
Congress can and often does include in legislation statutory
program evaluation requirements,239 but these generate only
post-enactment information about legislation. They provide no
incentive for Congress to engage in rigorous pre-enactment
assessment of its legislative choices. Therefore, Congress should
take maximum advantage of its ability to hold committee hearings, its significant investigative powers and its own adjunct
offices: the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the General

236. In NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994), the Court considered whether the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, was implicated if the alleged
racketeering activity lacked any economic motive. In holding that economic motive
was not necessary, the Court addressed the respondents' citation of statutory findings
as support for the economic motive requirement. The findings stated that the statute
is directed at the activities of groups that drain "billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption." Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (statement of Findings and Purpose). The Court concluded
that despite the findings, Congress chose to enact a more general statute. The opinion says that the findings are a "rather thin reed" to make the economic motive
essential. 114 S. Ct. at 805. This suggests that findings will be consulted by the
Court for indications of what Congress intended, but not to limit the reach of
statutes to matters expressly mentioned in the findings. This interpretive approach
makes the use of carefully crafted findings a relative risk-free step by Congress.
237. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting) Congress amended the
statute under review in Lopez before the Supreme Court made its decision. Congress
added express statutory findings about the impact of guns in schools on interstate
commerce, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (1994), but the Court
took little account of those findings.
238. See infra Part II.C (discussing textualism).
239. They come in various forms, including limited authorization terms so that programs will be subjected to full congressional review in order to continue past a specified period of time, mandated reports to Congress by the agencies charged with implementation, and provisions that explicitly state a date on which certain provisions
will expire.
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Accounting Office (GAO), and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).
None of these suggestions are intended to imply that Congress is not using the available resources. Rather, they flow
from the belief that congressional decision making could be
improved if those resources were tapped more filly. ° To
some degree, this is a call for a changed perspective on the role
of research and available knowledge, a perspective that puts increased value on the contributions research can make to public
decisionmaking"
There is reason to fear that Congress will decrease rather
than increase its use of the existing research entities. The legislative appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996 eliminated the
Office of Technology Assessment." One commentator on this
development observed:
The OTA is bipartisan and bicameral by design, overseen
by a board composed of equal numbers of Republicans and
Democrats, senators and representatives. This attention to
balance runs through the whole body-the OTA is enjoined

not to recommend a single policy, but instead to set out the
consequences of different policies. The OTA has often seen
this neutrality as its strength. Yet now it is revealed as a
weakness. In a highly charged political atmosphere, impartiality and independence, laudable in technical analysis, can

be transmuted into friendlessness and isolation.'

z

240. A useful discussion of how congressional staff use policy analysis and research
is Carol H. Weiss, Congressional Committees as Users of Analysis, 8 J. POL. ANALYSIS
& MGMT., 411-31 (1989). She concluded that while structural arrangements work
against the use of analysis, there is some evidence that staff are aware of available
analytical research and use it, primarily for political advantage and also take it as a
way to be warned of some problems and for guidance on particular issues. She found
little evidence that use of policy analysis led to fundamental changes in policy direction. See also HETEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 949-54.
241. A recent General Accounting Office report indicates congressional interest in
having better knowledge of agency information, but does not address the need for
information from non-agency sources. Program Evaluation: Improving the Flow of
Information to the Congress, GAO/PEMD-95-1, January 30, 1995.
242. Pub. L. 104-53, 109 Stat. 514 § 113 (1996).
243. Reassessment With Extreme Prejudice, THE ECONOMIST (U.K.), Aug. 12, 1995,
at 65.
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An example of OTA's work is a 1984 report about the proposed "Star Wars" defense system. An OTA paper concluded:
The prospect that emerging "Star Wars" technologies, when
further developed, will provide a perfect or near-perfect
system, literally removing from the hands of the Soviet
Union the ability to do socially mortal damage to the United States with nuclear weapons, is so remote that it should
not serve as the basis of public expectation or national
policy about ballistic missile defense.'
At least one commentator has suggested that "the circumstances of the congressional role make a more rigorous application of policy research nearly impossible and practically unwarranted."' He argues that the constraints of time and political
imperatives under which Congress operates are barriers to the
more effective use of research-based knowledge.' There is little debate about the proposition that Congress operates under
significant time constraints and political pressures. But the
kind of knowledge-based decisionmaking called for here does
not necessarily require any additional demands on Congress'
time or adjustment of the role played by political pressures.
The research-based knowledge discussed in Part III with respect to crime and welfare reform, for example, was put before
Congress through the testimony of witnesses and hearings and
the insertion of such information into the Congressional Record
during debate. No additional time is associated with taking
such information into account when proposals are before the
legislature. The impact of political pressures, on the other hand,
is inherent in legislative deliberation no matter how much policy-relevant research is or is not available. As discussed in Part
III, this is both appropriate and inevitable. The suggestion in
this Part, that Congress use knowledge more effectively, accepts
that political forces will sometimes drive decisions. There are
appropriate concerns, however, about the degree to which this
occurs in the face of powerful contrary factual knowledge.

244. Id.
245. Daniel A. Dreyfus, The Limitations of Policy Research in Congressional Decision Making, in USING SOCIAL RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 100 (Carol H.
Weiss, ed. 1977).
246. Id.

1996]

CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

709

B. The Electorate Should Ask Tougher Questions
If the only standard for judging congressional action is
whether it can withstand constitutional challenge, the electorate
effectively cedes to the litigation arena much of its ability to
assess whether the legislature is achieving what the electorate
wants. In formal and informal meetings, written correspondence, congressional hearings and other public forums, the
electorate should be asking legislators at least three questions:
Why do you think this legislation will do what you say it will?
What is the evidence this problem merits devoting substantial
federal resources to it? What other solutions to the problem
have you considered? To the extent legislation under discussion
contains statutory findings, legislators should have substantial
testimonial or other support for such findings. To the extent
there is widely available information on a particular proposal,
the public should also expect legislators to directly confront research that challenges the premises of the proposal and its
prospects for efficacy.
In addition to the topics discussed above, there is other legislation approved by the 104th Congress that would be appropriate targets of such questions. Legislation to strengthen company defenses against investor lawsuits was challenged as unnecessary. ' Much of the social program legislation is being
amended to turn over to the states in "block grants" the money
that has in the past been distributed from the federal government directly to recipients.'
There is reason to question
whether there is evidence to support the apparent congressional
belief that states and localities are more efficient and responsive to constituent concerns as they administer governmentfunded social programs. 9 The proposal to amend the Constitution to permit statutes that make flag desecration a crime5 0

247. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995). See Jeff Gerth, Overhaul of Securities Laws: A Fast Track to Change
or a Hasty Decision?, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at A19.
248. See supra part III.B.2 (discussing welfare reform proposals).
249. See Pendulum Politics, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1995, at C7.
250. H.J. Res. 79 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), approved by the House on June 7,
1995. An equivalent resolution, S.J. Res. 31, failed in the Senate on December 13,
1995.
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appears to have support despite the lack of evidence that flag
desecration occurs with any frequency. While for many voters
and legislators the flag's symbolic significance is reason enough
to take steps to protect it, amending the Constitution is such a
significant act that it merits thorough examination, including
the question whether it is necessary.
Finally, comparable questions should be raised about legislative efforts to repeal or significantly reduce funding for existing
programs. For example, the electorate should ask for evidence
that a program targeted for repeal or major funding reductions
is not working in its current form or evidence that it will continue to function effectively with fewer fiscal resources.
With all of these questions, the answers should consist of
more than multiple anecdotes. Legislators should show that
their responses reflect use of the resources of the CRS, GAO
and the OTA, along with the results of other pertinent governmental and private research efforts.
There are admittedly few ways for the electorate to raise
these questions. As discussed in Part III, lawsuits and voting
people out of office are insufficient mechanisms. Moreover, lobbyists supply legislators with many of the questions and answers that relate to legislative proposals.2 5 ' The actual and
perceived role of paid lobbyists may even discourage some members of the electorate from engaging in sharp questions about
the justifications for congressional actions. The idea that people
want a government that works well as an incentive for more
voter engagement is appealing, but unlikely to provide the
motivation for voters to press the kinds of questions raised
here. Nevertheless, there are some approaches that hold some
potential for increasing legislator attention to the kinds of questions posed above.
The greatest promise for such tough questioning may be the
charged atmosphere of partisan campaigning. In partisan politics, each side wants to challenge the value of the other side's
ideas. The electoral process can thus provide an incentive for
probing questions.

251. This is one of the points made in Weiss, supra note 242.
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For example, the political parties could incorporate the questions suggested above into their challenges to the other party's
platform claims and political rhetoric. Public debates can provide the opportunity for incumbent legislators and their challengers to pose such questions to each other. To the extent that
candidates hold open question and answer sessions for voters,
such questions should be a regular feature of the dialogue.
An example of how candidates might develop their challenges
to each other comes from the dissenting views in the Committee Report to accompany H.R. 999, the Welfare Reform and
Consolidation Act of 1995.252 The dissenting members of the
Committee objected to several aspects of the deliberative process, including the failure of the Committee to take into account the conclusions of witnesses that had appeared before
them. They said:
We are mystified as to why Republicans in the 104th Congress suggest that there is something to be gained from
dismantling [the supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children] (WIC). The committee has heard
no testimony complaining of "burdensome bureaucracies"
from the program directors....
After only one hearing during the 104th Congress, in which
all Republican witnesses testified against the [proposal to
end targeted funding for the school nutrition program] and
despite the lack of any legitimate hearing record supporting
the H.R. 999 proposal, the Republicans insist on going forward.'
Such challenges to the process and content of congressional
decisionmaking could be readily framed as questions for use in
political debates.

252. H.R. Rep. No. 104-75, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
253. H.R. Rep. No. 104-75, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) at 402-04 (dissenting
views). The dissenters were all Democrats, but part of their frustration evidently
comes from the fact that even the Republicans' own chosen witnesses testified against
the action taken by the Committee.

712

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
V.

[Vol. 30:653

CONCLUSION

Congress has traditionally had the authority and primary
responsibility in our constitutional system for determining both
legislative fact and public policy. Congress should make maximum use of its access to relevant knowledge, and articulate its
findings clearly. Failure to do so puts its own institutional
stature at risk and robs the public of the benefits of Congress'
best work.

